Court Findings & Appeals March 2016

Widow who believed that deceased husband gave gifts to his former wife thus violating the widow’s post-nuptial agreement with her deceased husband sought information regarding the former wife’s banking accounts. Third DCA blocked the discovery as the widow had full access to her deceased husband’s banking accounts and therefore could discern from that documentation whether payments were made. Further, there had yet to be determination that widow was entitled to an accounting of the deceased husband’s estate or whether she would be entitled to recovery from former wife even if her allegations proved to be true.

 

Annulment of marriage of ward who was previously declared incompetent was upheld. Ward did not have right to marry without court approval and said approval was not secured. The court did not have the power to approve the marriage after the fact. Instead, the right to marry had to be approved prior to the marriage. However, the case is very interesting for its detailed dissent stressing the fundamental right to marriage protected by the United States Constitution.

 

On remand, trial court found that Wife was entitled to only $88.50 a month as her marital portion of the husband’s pension. The trial court found this amount to be de minimus, and based on other aspects of the divorce (such as wife receiving support for the three years it took to litigate the dissolution) did not award this portion of the pension in equitable distribution. The 5th DCA rejected the finding that that $88.50 a month was de minimum (especially in wife’s perspective) and that the amount should have been allowed as part of equitable distribution.

 

Order for psycho-sexual evaluation of Father that was allegedly essential to enable the court to adequately direct Father’s contact with children was remanded for further findings. There was no court reporter, and given the lack of findings in the order, good cause was not explained and the fact that father’s mental condition was in controversy was not evident from the appellate record. Further, the scope of the order was too broad as it did not specifically indicate the length of the examination, the type of testing, or whether the testing would be limited to methods routine to the profession.